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Abstract: In this study, we examine various effects of carbon emission regulation enacted in South
Korea. We provide empirical evidence of regulated firms strategically hedging against potential
risks by increasing the number of directors with environment-related backgrounds. We also find
that this relationship is clearly evidenced when the firm is owned by a lower proportion of foreign
investors. Further analysis shows that these directors successfully change their firms to become
environmentally friendly. Overall, we conclude that the role of governments in promoting green
finance is crucial. The findings of this study may be used as a guideline for decision makers and
environmental policymakers to create systems and policies to increase the firm’s awareness about
the environment in relation to corporate environmental responsibility (CER) ratings of firms.
Keywords: emission regulation; board characteristics; corporate environmental responsibility
1. Introduction
Being environmentally responsible is becoming more important for sustainable growth
at both firm and national levels. To effectively reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs), the South
Korean government enacted a comprehensive law that compels all firms, regardless of their
financial status, to disclose their GHG emission to the public if it exceeded 125,000; 87,500;
and 50,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2-eq) in 2011, 2012, and 2014, respectively.
The South Korean government enacted the Framework Act on Low-Carbon, Green Growth
in 2010, whereby, in accordance with Article 42 (6), the Minister of Environment issued
comprehensive policy measures as the Principles of Target Management for Greenhouse
Gases and Energy. The law is established to regulate and reduce firms’ GHG emissions. In
addition to the emission history disclosure, firms are regularly monitored by government
agencies and are given emission guidelines that should be followed. Therefore, regulated
firms are exposed to a number of risks, for example, disclosing previously confidential
information about their emissions and their manufacturing details to third parties may
result in negative environmental publicity.
However, navigating regulations is difficult as many firms encounter these environ-
mental regulations for the first time, and board members may not be familiar with such
laws. Therefore, regulated firms have higher incentives to hire CEOs and directors who
have work or academic experience in environment-related fields—hereinafter, we define
these as green CEOs and green directors, as components of green boards. Directors’ prior
experiences are well reflected in their management styles [1,2]. As green CEOs and di-
rectors would have higher level of knowledge of GHG emissions and policies related to
them, they may be able to navigate the regulations. Ultimately, they may enhance a firm’s
competitive advantage in corporate environmental responsibility (CER).
Therefore, in this study, we investigate the extent to which the compliance with
environmental regulations, which compels firms to disclose their emissions data, affects the
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composition of the boards of these firms. Since green CEOs and green directors constitute
environment-field-related expertise, we hypothesize that their management style may be
reflected in a firm’s corporate environmental responsibility (CER) performance metrics.
If the corporate decisions by newly hired green CEOs or directors are towards firm’s
green growth, then the government agencies such as the Korea Corporate Governance
Service (KCGS) would note such changes thus reflect on the Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) grade.
Quantitatively measuring the level of CER or CSR engagement is difficult. Therefore,
this study uses firm-level CER and CSR scores from the KCGS database to proxy them.
Prior studies often use the KCGS database to measure a firm’s CSR level (Kim, 2009 [1]). The
data source provides a firm’s CER scores from grade “D” to grade “A+.” KCGS provides
CER scores of all KOSPI exchange listed firms and some companies listed on the KOSDAQ
exchange. For KOSDAQ listed firms, KCGS evaluates their CER level if institutions
inquire. Furthermore, to mitigate the subjectivity issue, KCGS uses various sources, such
as corporate disclosure information, supervisory authority reports, government reports,
and news data. In addition, KCGS tries to meet international standards, such as the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) corporate governance
principles and ISO26000, as well as the Korean law. Therefore, prior studies examining the
Korean CSR or CER often use the KCGS database [3].
Regression analysis shows that regulated firms would be more likely to hire both
green CEOs and green directors. We further show that such relationships manifest when
there is lower proportion of foreign institutional ownership. Employing a propensity
score matching (PSM) approach [4], we confirm that the relationship does not occur due
to endogeneity.
Hereinafter, we assess the effectiveness of green CEOs and directors as factors in-
fluencing the firm’s attitude toward CER. The extensive literature commonly postulates
that managing CER is beneficial. For example, prior studies show that environmental
management positively affects the future performance of firms [5–7], reduces the cost of
equity [8], and improves corporate innovation [9]. However, there is very little investiga-
tion of mechanisms that influence positive CER management. Thus, we test whether green
boards successfully lead a firm’s attitude toward CER and report that the proportion of
green boards is positively associated with a firm’s attitude toward CER, as measured by
CER ratings.
This study makes clear contributions to the literature. While there are many studies
on the effects of environmental regulation on financial and operational performance of
firms [10–12] or on corporate disclosure to develop an environmental strategy [13,14], stud-
ies on how regulation influences the composition of board characteristics are limited. Thus,
our study contributes to the existing literature by, first, identifying an additional possible
outcome of environmental regulations. Second, we highlight the role of governments as
their sanctions positively induce firms to have higher awareness of green finance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the
literature on managerial behavior. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 shows the main
results of our analysis. Finally, we discuss our conclusions in Section 5.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Classic theories emphasize firm-level or industry-level explanations as primary deter-
minants of firm’s policies and decisions [15–17]. Typical example is the trade-off between
the tax deductibility and bankruptcy costs. However, recent evidence began to note what
has not been clearly predicted in the traditional theories [18]. Studying the role of man-
ager’s behavior and its effects on corporate decisions is an example. A growing literature
highlights the importance of the board members for a firm’s policies [19–23]. Bertrand
and Schoar (2003) [19] investigate whether individual managers affect corporate behavior.
The article finds that managers from earlier birth cohorts appear on average to be more
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conservative, and that managers who hold an MBA degree seem to more aggressively
seek managers.
Benmelech and Frydman (2015) [1] analyze the relationship between military service
of managers and their decisions, financial policies, and outcomes. The authors provide
empirical evidence that military service is associated with conservative behavior and
conservative corporate policies. Furthermore, they also find that those managers are less
likely to engage in corporate investment or corporate fraudulent activities.
Similarly, Cain and McKeon (2016) [2] and Sunder et al. (2017) [23] use a unique
pilot license status data to show that managers’ hobbies of flying airplanes are positively
associated with the firm’s innovation (Sunder et al., 2017). In addition, Cain and McKeon
(2016) [2] show that firms led by those managers have higher equity return volatility
above the amount explained by compensation components. A proliferating literature
focuses on how managers’ prior experiences affect corporate policies such as leverage [21],
corporate innovation [23]. However, not many have observed the effects of managers’ prior
experiences in environmental related fields and their future decisions.
Regarding the literature on CER, a vast literature has underscored the importance of
CER. Especially, environmental responsibility is an important research topic for sustainable
growth [24–26]. Prior studies have well examined how environment-related risks affect
societies. For instance, Vesalon et al. (2013) [27] examine the environmental risk involved
in a proposed gold-mining project and find that environmental risk has a socially con-
structed horizon and that counter-discourses on risk represent a fundamental contribution
of the environmental protesters to the anti-mining movement. Furthermore, Shahzad et al.
(2020) [28] find that CSR practices have a significant influence on environmentally sus-
tainable development. Authors argue that CSR activities should be embedded in the
organizational environmental strategies for green innovation since CSR dimensions have
positive relations with environmentally sustainable development.
Studies thus highlight the importance of policies that could enhance the level of envi-
ronmental responsibility and also mitigate the climate issues. For instance, Eitan (2021) [29]
find that policymakers tend to focus on promoting mitigation strategy rather than an
adaptation strategy. The findings shed light on the important role of international influence
which tends to emphasize mitigation over adaptation. Furthermore, May Tan-Mullins and
Mohan (2013) [30] argue that since the environmental protection is weak in developing
countries, there is a need for governments to create a legislative and institutional frame-
work. It is also important to examine the effectiveness of the environmental regulation.
Masud et al. (2018) [31] show that banking companies disclosed more green information
in line with environmental regulation.
A strand of studies has shown that being environmentally responsible positively
affects firm performance [32–44], and innovation [45]. For instance, Deng and Cheng
(2019) [41] find that CER and stock market performance has a positive correlation. In
addition, researchers found that CER contributes to lowering a firm’s information risk [46],
increases firm risk [47,48], enhances value of shareholders [49], and increases board di-
versity [50]. However, there also exists studies that ESG activities negatively affect firm
performance [51]. For instance, Kim and Lee (2020) criticized the overinvestment behavior
to maintain certain ESG performance [52]. There are also researchers that maintain a neutral
view on firm’s CER engagement. Chapple et al. (2005) [53] finds that CER strength does
not affect firm performance. Kim and Statman (2012) [54] insist that corporation control
CER activities consistent with the interest of shareholders.
While studies on examining the effects of CER are proliferating, relatively less at-
tention has been given to investigating factors that drive such decisions. Previous re-
search shows that corporate governance structure [55], board of directors affects the ESG
performance [56], institutional ownership structure [57], and outside directors such as
corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees also have positive effects on ESG per-
formance [58]. Furthermore, several researchers have shown that environmental regula-
tions [59], business leaders’ governmental intervention [60], religion [61], and lowering
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financial constraints [62] promote CER decisions. On the other hand, few researchers insist
that government has responsibility to encourage corporations to engage in CER [63,64].
Based on prior studies on board characteristics and CER, there is a gap between those
two strands of literature. Therefore, this research aims to first show how firms respond
to environmental regulations and second show how board diversity, especially a board’s
experiences related to its environment, can explain the variation in the CER performances.
To formally put the two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. (Other things being equal) Environment regulation induces firms to increase the
proportion of green CEOs and green directors.
Hypothesis 2. (Other things being equal) The proportion of green CEOs and directors is positively
associated with CER.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Environmental Regulation Data
The regulations compelling those firms emitting GHGs in excess of 125,000 tCO2-eq
in disclosing their emission information were enacted in 2010. The emission information
is made public in the annual business reports (comparable to the 10-K in the United
States of America), which are available from the DART database (comparable to the
EDGAR database in the United States of America). We manually transcribe this emissions
information from these annual reports.
3.2. Green Boards Data
We identify green CEOs and green directors using the TS2000 database. This database
provides information on the education and work experience of CEOs and directors of
public firms. We define a green CEO as an indicator variable with an assigned value of one
where the CEO has either educational or prior work experiences in an environment-related
area. Similarly, we define a green director as a continuous variable with an assigned value
equal to the proportion of green directors of the total number of directors.
3.3. CER Rating Data
In many cases, researchers overcome the difficulties of quantitatively measuring the
level of CER engagement by using proxy measurements. The Korea Corporate Governance
Service (KCGS) database provides an annual CER score for each firm.
Figure 1 illustrates the green CEO ratio, green director ratio, and the number of regu-
lated firms annually. Note that both the green CEO and green director ratios have increased
significantly after enactment of the environmental regulation in 2010. Furthermore, we
find that the number of regulated firms also increased because of the stricter emission
restriction enacted in 2012 and 2014.
3.4. Control Variables
In addition, we add a number of variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
These include log(assets), Tobin’s q, log(sales), asset tangibility, leverage, cash, and cash
flow. Furthermore, we employ year and industry fixed effects throughout. All errors are
clustered for each firm.
3.5. Sample
Although the regulation was enacted in 2010, our final dataset spans from 2012 to
2019 to observe the effects of the regulation after the enactment by lagging all control
variables. Furthermore, we limited the data to those of manufacturing firms to which
the law exclusively applies. Thus, the data sample comprised 10,240 firms’ financial year
observations. All variables and their sources are provided in Table 1.
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Table 1. Variable description.
Variable Name Description Source
Green CEO
An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is
managed by a CEO with an academic or work experience
in environment related fields
TS2000
Green Director A proportion of directors who have academic or workexperiences in environment related fields TS2000
Regulation An indicator variable that equals one if the firm isregulated under the environment regulation act DART
CER Score Firm’s score on the environment section from the CSRscore, ranging from “D” to “A+”. KCGS
CSR Score Firm’s aggregated score from the environment, social, andgovernance secti s, ranging from “D” to “A+” KCGS
Tobin’s q
Tobin’s q calculated as follows: (the market value of
common stock + book value of preferred stock + (current
liabilities − current assets) + long-term debts)/book value
of total assets
COMPUSTAT
Log(s les) Log of a fi m’s sales COMPUSTAT
Tangibility Net tangible assets calculated as follows: total assets −intangible assets − total liabilities COMPUSTAT
Cashflow
Free cash flow calculated as follows: net income +





The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Panel A reports summary statistics
for non-regulated firms, and Panel B provides information of regulated firms. By com-
parison, it should be noted that, on average, compared to non-regulated firms, regulated
firms have a higher number of green CEOs and directors. Furthermore, we found that
the average CER scores of regulated firms are higher than those of non-regulated firms.
However, the differences in the interpretation of the results obtained through a univariate
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analysis may be ascribed to bias resulting from other, unobserved variables. Therefore,
we employed the regression analysis model with a number of control variables and fixed
effects to further test our hypotheses.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Panel A. Non-Regulated Firms
Obs. Average S.D. Min. Max.
Green CEO 8693 0.013 0.112 0 1
Green director 8693 0.001 0.016 0 0.467
CER score 2967 3.859 1.149 0 7
Tobin’s q 8693 1.335 1.333 0.038 55.823
Log(sales) (million KRW) 8693 5.151 0.64 2.379 8.362
Tangibility (million KRW) 8693 32,603.95 219,000 0 1.40 × 107
Cashflow (million KRW) 8693 11,507.05 121,000 −295,000 1.02 × 107
Panel B. Regulated firms
Green CEO 1547 0.095 0.293 0 1
Green director 1547 0.007 0.028 0 0.429
CER score 1249 4.825 0.977 0 7
Tobin’s q 1547 1.012 0.536 0.165 8.26
Log(sales) (million KRW) 1547 6.089 0.735 4.512 8.387
Tangibility (million KRW) 1547 359,000 951,000 1421.263 1.35 × 107
Cashflow (million KRW) 1547 149,000 693,000 −226,000 1.31 × 107
Note. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of non-regulated firms and Panel B provides the statistics for regulated firms. The data
period spans from 2012 to 2019. Green CEO is an indicator variable, which is equal to one if the firm is managed by a CEO who has a prior
job or academic experience in environment-related fields. Green director is a proportion of directors with prior job or academic experiences
in environment field. CER score is a continuous variable of scores with 0 representing “D” grade and 7 representing “A+” grade. Other
control variables are Log(asset), Tobin’s q, Log(sales), Tangibility, Leverage, Cash, and Cashflow.
4.2. Regulation and the Green Board
4.2.1. Baseline Regression Results
In this subsection, we employ a logistic regression and pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation method to test for the relation between the environmental regulation and
the board diversity. Thereafter, we use PSM to match the potential effects of endogeneity.
The estimation result is reported in Panel B of Table 3. Column (1) provides the result
for the green CEOs, and Column (2) shows the result for the green directors. We found that
regulated firms are 56.9% more likely to be managed by green CEOs and have a 2% higher
proportion of green directors when compared with non-regulated firms.
Table 3. Effects of the environmental regulation on the board characteristics.
Panel A. Summary Statistics between the Treated Group and the Control Group
Variable
(Lagged) Treated Control Bias t-Statistics
Tobin’s q 1.3527 1.6198 −22.5 −1.32
Log(sales) 5.7749 5.7656 1.1 0.15
Tangibility 4.6 × 105 3.5 × 105 10.8 1.47
Cashflow 2.3 × 105 1.9 × 105 16.9 0.42
Industry 36.138 37.144 −5.6 −0.84
Year 2015.0 2014.9 2.9 0.45
Panel B. Results of the OLS regression with and without PSM











Regulation 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.079 * 0.012 *
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Table 3. Cont.
Panel B. Results of the OLS regression with and without PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(2.337) (2.337) (1.665) (1.824)
Tobin’s q 0.000 0.000 −0.004 −0.001
(1.076) (1.076) (−0.890) (−1.449)
Log(sales) −0.001 ** −0.001 ** −0.006 −0.024 ***
(−2.288) (−2.288) (−0.215) (−6.943)
Tangibility 0.000 0.000 −0.000 * −0.000
(0.986) (0.986) (−1.723) (−0.272)
Cashflow −0.000 −0.000 0.000 *** 0.000
(−0.573) (−0.573) (3.160) (1.173)
Constant 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.524 *** 0.192 ***
(3.744) (3.744) (3.489) (9.731)
Observations 10,649 10,649 982 982
Adjusted
R-squared 0.291 0.291 0.174 0.510
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. This table provides the estimation result of the regression analyzing the effects of the environmental
regulation on the board characteristics. Panel A reports the result of propensity score matching (PSM), and Panel
B reports the regression results using the matched sample. Columns (1) and (2) show the result without PSM
samples, and Columns (3) and (4) provide results of PSM samples. We used logit regressions on Columns (1) and
(3). Furthermore, these results include control variables as well as industry and year fixed effects. Reported in
parentheses are t-value based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
We then employ PSM to dilute the effects of endogeneity. PSM quantifies the sensitivity
of the results for the primary causal variable to unobserved correlated omitted variables [65].
First, we perform a logit regression on the regulation indicator variable. Thereafter, we
selected all control variables to balance the confounding factors in the matching procedure.
Panel A of Table 3 provides the matching result. It should be noted that the differences
between the treatment and comparison groups are statistically insignificant for all variables,
indicating that the samples are well matched. The regression analysis results using PSM
are presented in Columns (3) and (4) of Panel B. We found that the regulation has a positive
effect on the proportional composition of green boards. Overall results indicate that firms
respond to the environmental regulations strategically. As a short-term measure, firms hire
green CEOs and directors with the assumption that they will manage compliance with the
regulations efficiently and increase their CER.
4.2.2. Effects of the Foreign Investors
In this subsection, we test for the effects of monitoring by foreign investors. In
previous studies, it is generally accepted that foreign investors in emerging markets seek
out short-term investments [66,67]. As environmental projects are often long term, a higher
proportion of foreign shareholders may discourage the firms from hiring green CEOs and
green directors.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. As CEOs are considerably impor-
tant people in firms [19,68], the board would be motivated to recruit green CEOs under
the regulations. However, short-term investors such as foreign investors may discourage
firms from hiring green CEOs. To test the effects of foreign institutional investors on firm’s
willingness to employee green CEOs and green directors, we employed an interaction term
analysis where we interacted the regulation status dummy and foreign ownership variable.
Our findings concur with those of previous studies in that the likelihood of firms hiring
green CEOs is evidenced only in firms managed by foreign minority investors. These results
indicate that short-term investors will encourage firms to focus on short-term projects.
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Table 4. Effects of the foreign institutional investors.
(1) (2)
Variable (Lagged) Green CEO Green Director
Regulation * Foreign Ownership −0.003 *** −0.005
−9.122 −1.369
Observations 10,158 10,649
Adjusted R-squared 0.162 0.01
Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Note. This table shows the results of further analysis. The table provides subsample analysis results with before
and after the emission trading scheme regulation enacted in 2014 and low and high proportion of the foreign
institutional ownership (low if the stock ownership by foreign investors is below 50% and high for the rest).
Furthermore, all results include control variables used in Table 3 as well as industry and year fixed effects.
Reported in parentheses are t-value based on standard errors clustered by firm. * and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
4.3. Green Boards and CER Rating
Our second hypothesis is explained by investigating the role of the green board in
improving corporate CER competitiveness. It is assumed that the expectation for regulated
firms in hiring green CEOs or directors is the improvement of their competitive advantage
through CER. Therefore, we assessed the impact of green boards through an empirical
analysis of CER scores.
The results of our analysis are shown in Table 5. As CER is graded alphabetically (“A+”
and “D”), adopting a pooled OLS regression is not an appropriate method for analysis.
Therefore, we used a rank ordered logistic regression, which finds popular acceptance as
a method of analysis using sequential variables [69,70]. Columns (1) and (2) show that
both green CEOs and green directors increase the CER rating of firms, and Columns (4)
and (5) show that green CEOs and green directors are also able to increase the overall
CSR score. Interesting result emerged when we ran the regression again using a new
variable that indicated that firms that hire both green CEO and green director. Results
show that hiring both green CEO and green director in the same year resulted in higher
increment in both CER and CSR scores compared to cases where we hired only green CEO
or green director. This implies that when both the CEO and directors have a common
environment-related background, there exists a synergistic effect that positively affects
firm’s CER performance. Overall results indicate that green CEOs and directors impact the
CER competitive advantage of firms.
Table 5. Effects of the green CEOs and directors on firm’s CER score and CSR score.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable (Lagged) CER CER CER CSR CSR CSR
Green CEO only 0.398 *** 0.305 **
(4.470) (2.690)
Green director only 3.719 ** 2.344 ***
(2.230) (3.520)
Both Green CEO & director 4.047 ** 6.975 ***
(2.430) (4.400)
Observations 4206 4206 4206 4206 4206 4206
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. This table provides the estimation result of the regression analyzing the effects of the green board on
the CER score. Columns (1) and (2) provide the results for the green CEO and the green director, respectively.
Columns (3) and (4) show the results for the overall CSR score, which is calculated by the sum of three categories:
environmental (E), social (S), and governance (G). Furthermore, results include control variables as well as
industry and year fixed effects. Reported in parentheses are t-value based on standard errors clustered by firm.
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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5. Discussion and Conclusions
This study identified the advantages of green finance under the exogenous environ-
mental regulation in South Korea. Unlike previous studies that investigated the effects of
regulation on financial or operational performance, we focused on the internal organization
of firms. Analysis results show that regulated firms respond to regulations strategically by
increasing the proportion of green CEOs and directors. We also examined the role of green
CEOs and directors, especially in relation to the CER ratings of firms, and found that green
boards succeed in raising the CER ratings of firms. This implies that the regulated firm’s
decision to recruit green CEOs and directors as a hedge against the risks of disclosure
is successful.
Being environmentally responsible is becoming an important question and task world-
wide. Global warming is now a significant factor that needs to be seriously considered.
Prior literature has mostly focused on examining the roles of government-level policies
and how the introduction of such policies affects global warming. At the same time, it is
also important to recognize how companies respond to such policies and changes. Our first
finding that companies increase the proportion of green CEOs and directors in response
to environmental regulations implies that firms view environmental risk as one of the
key risks they have to tackle. Since environmental risk differs from other conventional
risks, firms hire managers with a background in environment-related fields. Furthermore,
another finding that such firms managed by green managers are more environmentally
responsible is encouraging and has policy implications. Prior studies have commonly
argued that CER is beneficial for a firm’s sustainable growth. Since our research has shown
that hiring green managers benefits firms in multiple ways, policymakers may use this
research to design policies that may help firms to hire green managers. Furthermore, the
findings of this study may also be used as a guideline for decision makers and environ-
mental policymakers to create systems and policies to increase the firm’s awareness about
the environment in relation to CER ratings of firms. Specifically, we emphasize the role
of governments in promoting greener production as our results show that the regulation
effectively diversifies a firm’s board characteristics and attitude toward green finance.
One clear limitation of the research is on the data. While we were able to obtain
the Korean listed firms’ managerial background and information such as their education
level and prior work experience, we could not get access to non-listed firms’ data. Since
the TS2000 database, which we used to obtain the education and work experience status,
updates the information for publicly listed firms, we were not able to access information
about other firms. This lack of the data leads to the potential future research. If the data of
non-listed firms is available, researchers could compare how small-and-medium sized non-
listed firms respond to publicly listed firms. Listed firms are generally larger in size and
profitability compare to non-listed firms. Therefore, the statistically significant relationship
we have investigated using the data sample of listed firms may not be observed for non-
listed firms. Then, this would also imply that governments should impose different policies
and sanctions for small-and-medium sized companies.
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Romania: ‘Cyanide Kills!’! Area 2013, 45, 443–451. [CrossRef]
28. Shahzad, M.; Qu, Y.; Javed, S.A.; Zafar, A.U.; Rehman, S.U. Relation of environment sustainability to CSR and green innovation:
A case of Pakistani manufacturing industry. J. Clean. Prod. 2020, 253, 119938. [CrossRef]
29. Eitan, A. Promoting Renewable Energy to Cope with Climate Change—Policy Discourse in Israel. Sustainability 2021, 13, 3170.
[CrossRef]
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